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Abstract – This paper estimates the impact on a sample of 34 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries of eliminating tariffs on imports from the EU under Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), considering trade, welfare and revenue effects. Even assuming ‘immediate’ 
complete elimination of all tariffs on imports from the EU, some two-thirds of ACP countries are 
likely to experience welfare gains; the ACP overall and the average ACP country gain. The 
overall welfare effect relative to GDP tends to be very small, whether positive or negative. While 
potential tariff revenue losses are non-negligible, given that countries have at least ten years in 
which to implement the tariff reductions, there is scope for tax substitution. An important issue is 
identifying the sensitive products (SPs) to be excluded from tariff reduction. We exclude products 
where ACP imports compete with the EU (as SPs have to be agreed at the regional ACP level). In 
general, excluding SPs on these criteria reduced the welfare gain (or increased the welfare loss) 
compared to estimates where no products are excluded. It remains the case that the ACP overall 
and on average gains, although only 13 countries (38%) experience a net gain in this scenario (but 
for another nine the net effect is zero or almost zero). This is to be expected as if ACP products 
are excluded as SPs the potential trade creation gains are reduced. However, as the exclusion 
criterion was products that are traded between ACP countries, these import losses would be offset 
by gains to ACP exporting countries. Perhaps the most surprising result is that even where EPAs 
imply a welfare loss (on imports), the losses are likely to be very small. 
 
 






Although the European Union (EU) has provided 
trade preferences to the former colonies of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions since 
1975 under successive Lomé conventions, these 
preferences have been of limited value 
(Langhammer, 1992). This is not surprising as trade 
preferences in general have not provided significant 
benefits to developing countries (Ozden and 
Reinhardt, 2003), especially Africa (Brenton and 
Ikezuki, 2007). One reason for the limited effect is 
the conditions under which preferences were 
granted, either restricting the products eligible for 
full preferences (often excluding products of 
particular benefit to developing countries) or, 
especially in the context of EU preferences for the 
ACP, imposing very restrictive Rules of Origin 
requirements (thus limiting opportunities for 
diversification). Another reason relates to policy-
induced distortions in the ACP countries, so that 
actual incentives for production diversification are 
weak, exacerbating the problem of a narrow   2
production structure and primary commodity 
resource base. This is especially true for Africa (but 
applies more generally to ACP). Furthermore, there 
is excessive emphasis on expanding manufacturing, 
and recently services, exports. Thus, it is argued that 
achieving sustained growth in Africa requires 
implementing policies to expand exports, and to 
diversify exports away from dependence on a 
narrow range of (unprocessed) primary commodities 
(Commission for Africa, 2005). Trade preferences 
can play a role, as the experience to date with the 
US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
suggests (Frazer and van Biesebroeck, 2007). 
This emphasis on diversifying exports can divert 
attention away from what is required to enhance the 
competitiveness of existing producers, whether 
import-competing or traditional exports. In an ACP 
context, this means addressing the primary sector, 
especially agriculture, and more generally 
considering the import side of any trade policy 
(Morrissey, 2005). This is especially relevant to 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) as they 
will require ACP countries to eliminate tariffs on 
most imports from the EU, the impact of which will 
depend primarily on the structure of a country’s 
imports (EPAs include many other provisions and 
effects, as mentioned below, but the focus here is on 
ACP imports). There are benefits for products where 
there are few or no competing domestic producers – 
consumption gains from increased cheaper imports 
and potential welfare gains in sourcing imports from 
more efficient EU producers. There are potential 
welfare losses, or adjustment costs, where cheap 
imports from the EU domestic undermine domestic 
production or displace more efficient producers in 
the rest of the world.  
A specific feature of preferences under Lomé 
conventions is that they were granted to selected 
countries that were not required to grant reciprocal 
concessions to the EU; this was challenged under 
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and found to be ‘illegal’ under WTO rules. To 
continue preferences, the EU agreed a waiver in the 
WTO in 2001 to remain in effect until 2008, when a 
new WTO-compliant regime was to be in place. The 
Cotonou Agreement proposed introducing 
reciprocity through the establishment of a series of 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs), under 
which the EU and regional groupings of ACP 
countries offer reciprocal trade preferences to each 
other, as the new regime. Negotiations between the 
EU and ACP regional groups began in October 2003 
and entered the final stage in March 2007, with 
EPAs to be implemented from 2008. 
In principle, EPAs offer potential benefits to 
ACP countries beyond what was available under 
Lomé conventions. The preferential access to the 
EU is less restrictive: all ACP countries should have 
tariff-free access to the EU for almost all products; 
this should be available once the agreements are in 
place, and restrictions, such as Rules of Origin 
requirements, should be less than previously.
1  The 
ACP member countries should derive some benefit 
from enhanced regional integration as a precursor to 
EPAs: even if the actual trade benefits are limited, 
there are benefits from regional economic co-
operation. A range of trade-related policy reform 
commitments are included in the EU proposals, 
covering trade facilitation and investment, and 
perhaps also competition policy and government 
procurement. If implemented properly these could 
enhance the business environment in ACP countries, 
attracting investment and promoting exports. There 
is an expectation that some increased aid will be 
made available by the EU to support implementation 
of and adjustment to EPAs. 
There are potential costs to ACP countries 
through reciprocity as they are required to grant 
tariff-free access to imports from the EU. Although 
there is concern in ACP countries that such opening 
up to import competition from the EU will displace 
domestic production, it is not obviously the case that 
there will be adverse effects. The welfare impact of 
import liberalisation depends on the production and 
trade structure of the country in question, and as 
such is an empirical question. Of greater practical 
concern is the potential loss of revenue from tariffs 
on imports from the EU. However, ACP countries 
have at least 10 years to phase in tariff elimination,
2 
and even then can continue to exclude a range of 
designated ‘sensitive products’ (identifying these is 
                                                           
1  The EU proposal for EPAs is a ‘30% local value added’ 
threshold, compared to the current Cotonou Rules of Origin 
which are equivalent to a 60% threshold. The details have not 
been agreed, and some ACP countries favour a ‘change of tariff 
heading’ test, i.e. if the activity in the ACP countries changes 
the tariff classification the exported product is deemed to have 
origin in that country (Pearson, 2007). 
2  There are ACP proposals to extend the transition period up to 
20 years, given that the jurisprudence in relation to Article 
XXIV of GATT is not definitive and negotiations under 
Paragraph 29 of the Doha Mandate might be sympathetic to the 
ACP proposal for more flexibility.   3
a sticking point in negotiations). Thus, countries do 
have time to plan both their adjustment to the 
economic effects of increased imports and the 
revenue effect of eliminating tariffs. To design such 
plans they need information on the likely effects at a 
disaggregated product level. The aim of this paper is 
to assess the trade, revenue and welfare implications 
of EPAs on ACP countries’ agriculture imports from 
the EU, applying the analytical framework used by 
McKay et al (2005). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the progress of EPA 
negotiations and discusses some of the existing 
literature estimating the effects. Section 3 presents 
the partial equilibrium method used to estimate 
trade, revenue and welfare effects of introducing an 
EPA for EU imports to ACP countries.  Section 4 
provides our estimates, covering the majority of 
ACP countries except those in the Pacific, and 
discusses the issue of identifying sensitive products. 
Finally, section 5 sets out the implications of the 
analysis and summary conclusions. 
 
II.   THE STATUS OF EPA NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 71 
ACP states was concluded in February 2000 
covering various dimensions including economic 
relations, aid programmes, and trade co-operation, 
specifically the proposal for EPAs to be 
implemented over a 10-15 year transitional period 
starting by 2008 at the latest. The ACP countries 
were aware that EPAs offer limited benefits, 
although the situation differs between least 
developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs. The 
LDCs are entitled to essentially tariff-free access to 
the EU without committing to reciprocity. The non-
LDCs, however, could lose their Lomé-type 
preferences and would be granted only GSP access 
if EPAs were not in place. This loss of preferences 
could significantly undermine export 
competitiveness and damage major sectors 
dependent on exports to the EU, such as beef in 
Namibia and horticulture in Kenya (Stevens, 2007). 
Thus, non-LDCs have a strong incentive to sign 
EPAs to maintain preferential access for their 
exports to the EU. 
For ACP countries, the first step was to form 
themselves into regional groups, some of which are 
actually more advanced in regional integration than 
others, and six have emerged: Caribbean, Pacific, 
Central Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa 
(SADC) and East and Southern Africa (ESA, from 
which there is still a possibility of East Africa 
forming a separate group). It has been a problem for 
some African countries to decide which group to 
belong to for purposes of the EPAs.
3  
As the December 2007 deadline approached 35 
ACP countries signed EPAs either as a region or 
individuals, and the remaining 40 countries 
negotiating EPAs preferred not to sign. Only 15 
CARIFORUM and 5 EAC countries signed at 
regional level while the remainder 15 signed 
bilateral EPAs with the EU. Only the CARIFORUM 
EPA is a comprehensive EPA, the rest are Interim 
EPAs. See Appendix table A1. ACP countries that 
have not signed most of which are least developed 
took the risk of being relegated to the less 
advantageous EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) 
while non-least developed countries can claim only 
the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
available to a larger number of non-ACP developing 
countries. 
Interim EPAs represent an intermediate position 
before a full EPA following inability of ACP 
countries, for technical and political differences, to 
finalize comprehensive EPAs as originally foreseen 
by the Cotonou Agreement at the expiry of the 
special WTO Cotonou waiver on 31 December 
2007.  Interim EPAs are WTO-compatible 
arrangements (Article XXIV) designed to provide a 
continuation of ACP market access to the EU 
(established under the Cotonou/Lomé conventions) 
while working towards reaching a comprehensive 
and developmental EPA by the end of 2008 or mid 
2009. Unlike comprehensive or full EPAs which 
cover a wide range of trade issues, Interim EPAs are 
partial in scope covering only trade in goods. 
                                                           
3  SADC is a good example of the complexity in Africa. South 
Africa, the dominant member, only has ACP ‘observer status’ 
and had a free trade agreement with the EU. However, as of 
December 2006 the EU and South Africa agreed to abandon 
their Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
and allowed South Africa to become part of SADC in EPA 
negotiations. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are in 
a customs union with South Africa (SACU), whereas Angola, 
Mozambique and Tanzania (also in ESA and EAC) are not. It is 
far from clear how any EPA could treat all members of SADC 
equally.   4
Although  Interim EPAs are presented as 
involving minimal commitments by ACP countries 
(the EU offers 100% liberalisation by value of trade 
as of 1 January 2008) concerning trade in goods 
they have a wide scope and cover a lot more issues 
than simply satisfying WTO-compatibility. All 
Interim EPAs contain Core provisions concerning 
the conditions for the elimination of tariffs on goods 
(with product and timeframe details, see Appendix 
table A2), trade remedies (Safeguards), and 
provisions on rules of origin. Some Interim EPAs 
also include provisions for non-tariff measures 
(including Technical Barriers and Sanitory and 
Phytosanitory controls). They also include a 
Rendezvous clause which specifies issues for further 
negotiation (for example, trade in services, 
investment, government procurement, competition, 
intellectual property rights, and other areas). The 
reference to further negotiations in services differs 
for different Interim EPA texts, for example, in the 
context of Ghana such negotiations will seek to 
establish a cooperation framework while in the case 
of SADC countries they will be with a view to 
liberalize the sector. Other provisions include: third 
party MFN clause obliging ACP countries to extend 
to the EU, on a tariff line basis, any more favourable 
treatment offered by ACP countries to third party 
developed or major developing country in a new 
FTA; requesting ACP countries not to increase 
tariffs; obligation to eliminate existing export taxes 
and refraining from imposing additional taxes in the 
future. 
For some countries signing Interim EPAs can be 
said to have been influenced by special interest 
groups within individual countries who stood to lose 
significant export business with the EU if their 
countries did not sign (for example, cut flowers, 
meat, bananas, sugar, fish and services (e.g. tourism 
and music performances from the Caribbean 
region)), and also pressure posed by the EU as the 
deadline loomed.
4 
                                                           
4 For example, see: “Kenyan Flower Exporters Upbeat on New 
EU Trade Deal,” (Oct. 2007), http://www.lemali.fr/news/africa-
news/ Kenyan-Flower-Exporters-Upbeat-on-New-EU-Trade-
Deal-200710049694.html; “Flower Industry May Wilt if EPA 
Deadline is Missed,” Rosalia Omugo, Inter Press Service, (Sept. 
2007), http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=9700; 
“Namibia: Meat Exporters in a Panic Over EU”, Wezi Tjaronda 
(14 May 2007). All accessed March 2008. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200705140353.html; “Demain, sans 
APE, c’est la douane”, Luc Magloire Mbarga Atangana, (Dec. 
For Africa at least, existing regional integration 
arrangements (RIAs) are at best weak, have proved 
politically difficult to sustain and have generated 
few clear economic benefits (Lyakurwa et al, 1997). 
While integration can contribute to growth and 
development, notably by increasing the size of the 
market and attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI), most of the evidence for beneficial effects of 
RIAs relate to developed or middle-income 
countries (Schiff and Winters, 2003). The general 
problem has been that most of the benefits accrue to 
the largest and richest member, while few economic 
benefits accrue to the poorest members so deep 
integration has been difficult to achieve or sustain. 
This is an underlying problem in EPAs, especially in 
Africa, where the regional groups include at least 
one ‘large’ non-LDC member with (economically) 
small LDC members. The former stands to gain 
from securing trade preferences for the EU market 
whereas the latter have no preferences to gain 
(beyond what they should be entitled to even 
without EPAs). It is therefore relevant to assess the 
impact of reciprocity (offering tariff-free access to 
imports from the EU), and whether this may differ 
between LDCs and non-LDCs; we explore this for 
the agriculture sector. 
Whilst it is important for ACP countries to assess 
the effects of reciprocity on trade, welfare and 
revenue there are few assessments in the literature of 
the impact of EPAs. Busse and Grossman (2007) 
apply a differentiated product partial equilibrium 
model to analyse the trade and revenue effects of the 
EU-ECOWAS EPA. They find that the (static) trade 
effects are quite high (imports from the EU increase 
                                                                                              
2007) 
http://www.commodafrica.com/fr/actualites/matieres_premieres
/cameroun; and “Bananes - Les producteurs ivoiriens inquiets : 
Anxieuse attente des Ape”, (Nov 2007) 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=10273 . All 
accessed March 2008. 
The African Union Declaration on Economic Partnership 
Agreements (January 2008) noted that “political and economic 
pressures are being exerted by the European Commission on 
African countries to sign Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreements.” However, the EC considers this as a 
misconception (#1) saying “pressure came from the 
expectations of other WTO members, including non-ACP 
developing countries, that the EU and the ACP would respect 
their commitment to make their trade relations WTO-
compatible by 1 January 2008 …” (see EC’s “Six common 
misconceptions about Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs)” - Brussels, 11 January 2008 from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/january/tradoc_1374
84.pdf . Accessed July 2008)    5
by over 20 per cent for some products in some 
countries) although trade creation dominates trade 
diversion, so the welfare effect is positive for all 
countries. However, while revenue losses of 4 to 9 
per cent are the norm, some countries face much 
higher losses (among the non-LDCs, Ghana faces 
the highest revenue loss). Karingi et al (2005) use a 
combination of general and partial equilibrium 
modeling techniques and conclude that the likely 
revenue and adjustment will be costly for African 
countries. However, their estimate of welfare effects 
is based on consumption effects only, so they found 
welfare gains for all countries. McKay et al (2005) 
apply the partial equilibrium technique used below 
to East Africa and conclude that although the 
welfare effects (excluding revenue loses) are small, 
whether positive or negative, there are short-run 
adjustment costs and potentially large revenue 
losses. They find a negative short-run welfare effect 
on Tanzania (because the trade diversion effect from 
the rest of the world dominates) but a small positive 
short-run effect for Uganda (because the 
consumption gain dominates and the increase in 
imports from the EU displaces relatively inefficient 
imports from Kenya). Kenya is likely to experience 
a welfare loss, as it loses regional market share and 
faces increased competition from EU imports, but 
this must be set against the gains of preferential 
access to the EU (especially important for the now 
large horticulture sector). 
The EPAs can be WTO-compliant as long as, 
amongst other conditions, ‘substantially all the 
trade’ between partners is liberalised (i.e. subject to 
zero tariffs). Although there is agreement that this 
probably means about 80% of trade, it is not at all 
clear how this should be measured. Is it 80% of 
tariff lines or of the value of trade, before or after 
liberalisation? Consequently, it is not clear what 
proportion of ACP imports from the EU can be 
excluded from liberalisation, i.e. what proportion 
can be deemed sensitive products? As exports to 
the EU typically account for over 60% of total 
bilateral trade, ACP countries could exclude almost 
half of their imports from the EU. We assume that 
ACP countries will have to liberalise at least 70 
percent of trade (imports from the EU), and that 
whole sectors, such as apparel, cannot be omitted. 
We return to this issue when discussing sensitive 
sectors. 
 
III.  MODELING FRAMEWORK 
 
We apply the partial equilibrium analytical 
framework used by McKay et al (2005) and outline 
the core features here. This extends the established 
theoretical framework for analysing the economic 
(welfare) effect of regional integration (e.g., 
Balassa, 1974; Lyakurwa et al., 1997; Schiff and 
Winters, 2003) as applied by Panagariya (1998) to 
consider when small countries (in our case ACP) 
integrate with large countries (the EU in this case). 
Two effects are of particular importance in any 
analysis of the welfare effect of a regional 
integration agreement (RIA). Beneficial trade 
creation arises where inefficient production by 
domestic firms in a member country (ACP) is 
displaced by tariff-free imports by more efficient 
producers in another member country (the EU). This 
increases welfare in total through a more efficient 
allocation of production within the RIA. On the 
other hand, trade diversion imposes a welfare loss 
where trade from more efficient extra-regional 
suppliers (ACP imports from the Rest of the World, 
ROW) is diverted to less efficient intra-regional 
suppliers (the EU). For the RIA as a whole, welfare 
increases if trade creation is greater than trade 
diversion. We assume that the EU benefits, although 
we make no attempt to estimate this, and focus on 
the effects on ACP countries (and further, here, on 
agriculture only). 
Although partial equilibrium methods are limited 
and restrictive, they offer a number of advantages 
over alternative computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) approaches which make them attractive for 
our purposes. First, the data requirements are 
relatively simple: all we need are data on imports for 
a representative year disaggregated by source (ACP, 
EU and ROW) and product, whereas CGE analysis 
requires a model of the structure of the economy. 
Second, the analysis can be conducted at a high 
level of product disaggregation, compared to CGE 
analysis which typically requires sector aggregation, 
which is especially useful in attempting to identify 
sensitive products. Third, the estimates are quite 
easy to interpret as proportional effects on trade 
volumes and revenues. Fourth and consequently, the 
results are quite useful for policy-makers and 
negotiators. Finally, a more general benefit is that 
estimates can be provided, based on product detail, 
for a large number of ACP countries (whereas CGE   6
studies tend to be country-specific or to group 
countries). 
There are limitations, although no approach is 
without weakness. We do have to make a number of 
restrictive assumptions, such as on supply and 
import demand elasticities, although arguably the 
assumptions are no more restrictive than for 
alternative methods (and results are quite robust to 
sensitivity checks). More importantly, the analysis is 
limited to static trade effects; it does not allow for 
effects on or responses by domestic producers, or 
for any effects through factor markets and sector 
adjustment. Considering such effects would require 
general equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, the 
analysis does not account for changes in partner 
countries (e.g. if they also reduce tariffs) or the 
global market (e.g. world prices), or for possible 
changes in demand for exports, for example if trade 
preferences change (as under an EPA); addressing 
these issues would require a global model. The 
partial equilibrium approach does estimate likely 
first order effects on imports and in principle these 
could form a basis for more detailed CGE country 
studies where feasible. Thus, we consider the 
estimates to be indicative of the potential impact of 
EPAs on agriculture imports in ACP countries, 
highlighting products that individual countries may 
wish to consider in more detail. 
We estimate and report results for three effects. 
Consumption effects arise from increased imports at 
reduced prices; if the EU is initially the dominant 
supplier, the EPA results in pure consumption 
effects only, and this is clearly beneficial. Trade 
creation (TC) arises in this context when imports 
from the EU displace imports from other ACP 
countries; assuming the EU is the more efficient 
producer, this increases welfare in the importing 
country (although producers in the exporting ACP 
country lose).
5 Trade diversion refers to a situation 
where the elimination of tariffs allows EU suppliers 
to displace more efficient producers in the ROW; 
this is likely to arise if pre-EPA the ROW is the 
dominant supplier. 
                                                           
5  This differs slightly from the standard TC case as the 
displaced producers are not in the importing country (whose 
welfare is being measured) but in another ACP country (so the 
producer loss is not included in the estimates). As the EU would 
only displace ACP suppliers if the tariff-free EU price is lower 
than the ACP supplier price, it is assumed that in this case the 
EU is more efficient. This is not valid if there are other factors 
distorting EU export prices (such as agriculture subsidies). 
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare effects of an EPA 
from the perspective of a small home country 
member (denoted H) of the RIA among ACP 
countries that is negotiating with the EU. The larger 
ACP partner country (R) in the RIA is assumed to 
have an upward sloping supply curve (being 
relatively small, this is not unreasonable). There are 
initially two extra-regional suppliers, the EU and the 
ROW, both with infinitely elastic supply curves. For 
a given product: DH represents the home country’s 
demand for imports, SR  the partner’s (upward 
sloping) supply of exports (to H), and SEU and SW are 
the respective extra-regional export supply functions 
at constant cost (prices PEU and PW respectively). 
Assume for convenience that initially PEU > PW (this 
would not apply in our case where the EU is initially 
the dominant supplier), but once tariffs are 
eliminated the EU can meet all demand at PEU (i.e., 
SEU is below SR).  
There is a non-discriminatory (ad valorem) tariff 
(t) on extra-regional imports, where P
t
W = PW (1 + t) 
and initially H imports OM2 in total, with OM1 
coming from R and M1M2 from ROW (P
t
EU is not 
shown as the EU is assumed to be the higher cost 
supplier prior). Assuming no domestic production 
capability welfare (W’ and change in welfare 
denoted ￿W) is defined by the consumer surplus: W 
for  H is initially given by the consumer surplus 
triangle (the area below DH and above S
t
W) plus the 
tariff revenue on extra-regional imports (area a + b). 
Under the EPA, t applies to ROW but not the EU.  
The relevant supply price is now PEU with the total 
quantity of imports expanding from OM2 to OM3 
(the consumption effect). Figure 1 illustrates a case 
where all imports post-EPA come from the EU. The 
trade diversion effect is illustrated as M1M2, and the 
trade creation effect OM1. Different scenarios could 
be illustrated in separate figures, but it is more 
useful to consider other possibilities in describing 






Q  M3  M1 
















Fig. 1: Effect of an EU-ACP EPA 
 
A.  Estimating Trade and Welfare Effects 
In estimating effects we begin with the trade data 
and allocate imports by product into one of three 
cases. If initially the EU is the dominant supplier 
(accounting for at least 40% of imports), we assume 
that all effects are consumption gains (consumption 
effects only). If the ACP is initially a significant 
supplier (accounting for at least 20% of imports), we 
allow for the TC of the EU displacing ACP imports. 
If initially the ROW is the dominant supplier 
(accounting for at least 40% of imports), we assume 
that at zero tariffs the EU can displace all imports 
from the ROW to estimate the maximum TD 
potential (this is therefore unlikely to be the actual 
impact, but is a useful base for considering sensitive 
products). 
 
1.  Consumption Effects Only (CE) 
 
If the EU is initially the dominant supplier we can 




EU  in Figure 1; imports 
increase by M2M3 and we measure the welfare gain 
as area e. The consumption effect alone (
M C ∆ ) is 
estimated relative to existing EU import volumes as 
(where elasticities are the modulus, although of 
















= ∆                                 (1) 
where t is current tariff imposed on imports from the 
EU,  d
M η is the price elasticity of demand for 
imports, 
EU M 0 is the existing value of imports from 
the EU. 
As an EPA entails elimination of tariffs on 
imports from the EU, the tariff revenue loss on 
imports (
EU M 0 = OM2) and welfare effects can be 
estimated as follows: 
EU C M t R 0 . − = ∆                                                   (2) 
M C C t W ∆ = ∆ . ) ( 2
1                                             (3) 
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2. ‘Trade Creation’ with Consumption Effects 
(TC&CE) 
 
For the case where an ACP partner supplies a 
relatively significant share of imports one can 
estimate the effects of trade creation with 
consumption effects by considering the case where 
the ACP price lies over the relevant range between 
t
ROW P  and EU P .  In this case all ACP imports (OM1) 
will be replaced by imports from the EU.  The 
maximum value of trade creation with consumption 
effects (
C
M TC ∆ ) obtains where the price of ACP 
imports is as high as the tariff-inclusive price of 

















= ∆                       (4) 
where 
ACP M 0 is the current value of imports from 
ACP. 
 
Welfare effects of trade creation with 
consumption effects can be estimated as the 
combination of the maximum value of trade created 
by the displacement of ACP exports to partner 
country j and consumption effects of trade creation 
defined in equation (4) as follows: 
( ) ( ) C
M
ACP M
TC TC t t M W ∆ + = ∆ . ) ( . 2
1
0                  (5) 
 
3. ‘Trade Diversion’ with Consumption Effects 
(TD&CE) 
 
Relevant cases of trade diversion occur where more 
efficiently produced imports from the ROW (M1M2) 
are displaced by relatively less efficiently produced 
commodities from the EU due to an EPA.   
Commodities for which the ROW is a dominant 
supplier pre-EPA can be taken to indicate that the 
ROW is more efficient than the EU. Where an EPA 
leads to
t
ROW EU P P < under the prevailing constant 
production cost conditions the EU becomes the sole 
supplier to country j, and total import diversion will 
be the upper limit of trade diversion. Obviously, not 
all imports will be diverted from ROW, and we 
assume the EU must initially be supplying a 
reasonable share of imports of a product (at least 
20%) to have a capacity for TD. The consumption 
effects due to trade diversion (
C
M TD ∆ ) can be 
estimated in a similar way by assuming (in the 
absence of information about the level at which the 
post-EPA EU price will settle relative to 
t
ROW P  and 
ROW P ) that on average the post-EPA price of 


















= ∆                     (6) 
Evidently trade diversion will be associated with 
tariff revenue loss since country j switches from 
taxed ROW sources to duty free EU sources.  The 
tariff revenue loss due to trade diversion (with 
consumption effects) is given by: 
ROW C
TD M t R 0 . − = ∆                                              (7) 
Using the assumption that  EU P  lies halfway 
between 
t
ROW P  and  ROW P , the welfare impact of 
trade diversion with consumption effects can be 
estimated as the combination of consumption effects 
(from equation 6) and tariff revenue effects (from 
equation (7): 
( ) ( ) [ ] ROW C
M
M
TD M t TD t W 0 2
1
2
1 . . ) ( ) ( − ∆ = ∆        (8) 
In the context of Figure 1 we are effectively 
measuring  b – e minus revenue loss (a + b). In 
general, rather than imposing assumptions on the 
welfare effects of (fiscal adjustments associated 
with) the revenue loss, we will report the welfare 
effects excluding the revenue losses, which are 
reported separately. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
TO ACP IMPORTS 
 
Results are provided for 34 out of 71 ACP countries 
using the most recently available data matching 
imports and import tariff rates; for most countries 
the estimates use data from 2005 or 2006, though for 
some the data are earlier (the countries and years are 
listed in the tables of country summary results; some   9
results are also reported for Cuba and Surinam, but 
we had incomplete data for these countries).  Data 
on the value of imports (cif) and import tariff rates 
were constructed from COMTRADE data at the 5-
digit level in SITC format showing commodity 
description, country of origin and values.  The data 
were then aggregated across categories and source 
to obtain intra-ACP, ACP-EU and ACP-ROW 
values for the 4-digit SITC level. The import tariff 
rates used were Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rates 
as we did not have data on customs duty revenue 
collected (implicit tariffs).  The 8-digit HS MFN 
tariff rates data were first transformed to the 6-digit 
level and then to the SITC format using an HS (6-
digit) to SITC (4-digit) concordance. The trade 
elasticities used were obtained from Stern et al 
(1976) supplemented by elasticities from the 
GTAP/World Bank database. 
 
A. Estimation  Results 
 
Table 1 summarizes the welfare estimates 
distinguishing consumption effects (CE), TC&CE 
and TD&CE. Clearly, as shown above, the latter is 
always negative (or zero for Burkina Faso) and both 
of the former are positive (or zero in some cases), so 
the sign of the overall welfare effect depends on the 
relative magnitude of the latter. For the sample 
combined (all 34 countries) the welfare effect is 
positive but very small, at 0.01% of GDP (due 
entirely to CE); the ACP overall gains. The 
unweighted mean for the sample (average) is also a 
positive welfare effect of 0.005% of GDP 
(comprising a combination of effects); the average 
ACP country gains. Overall, 22 countries (two-
thirds) experience a net gain and 12 (one third) 
experience a net loss (indicated in italics). The 
welfare effects will depend on what is happening at 
an individual product level, in terms of both the 
ability of the EU to displace suppliers from ACP or 
ROW and the responsiveness of imports to a 
reduction in tariffs (as this determines CE).The 
countries that gain tend to have a relatively low 
initial share of imports from ROW (mostly less than 
50%, compared to mostly over 60% for losers, 
Appendix Table A1) so the potential for TD is 
limited. Similarly, the countries that gain tend to 
have a relatively higher initial share of imports from 
the EU.  
 
Table 1: Composition of Trade Effects (as % GDP) 
 
Notes: Figures report consumption effects (CE) only, trade 
creation (TC) from ACP and trade diversion (TD) from ROW. 
Countries with overall welfare losses are highlighted in italics; 
LDCs highlighted in bold; ‘All countries’ is combined total and 
‘average’ is sample mean (unweighted). 
 
Country  CE  TC&CE TD&CE Welfare 
All Countries (34)  0.010  0.000  0.000  0.010 
        
Antigua & Barbu  0.005  0.005  -0.015  -0.004 
Bahamas 0.000  0.000  -0.023  -0.023 
Belize 0.003  0.000  -0.008  -0.004 
Benin  0.009 0.002  -0.005  0.006 
Burkina Faso  0.003 0.001  0.000  0.004 
Cameroon 0.007  0.005  -0.004  0.008 
Central Africa R  0.002 0.003  -0.004  0.001 
Cote D'ivoire  0.013  0.001  -0.004  0.011 
Dominica 0.003  0.008  -0.015  -0.004 
Dominican Rep  0.001  0.000  -0.007  -0.005 
Gabon 0.019  0.001  -0.004  0.016 
Ghana 0.009  0.001  -0.010  0.001 
Grenada 0.004  0.016  -0.017  0.003 
Guyana 0.004  0.024  -0.018  0.011 
Jamaica 0.000  0.002  -0.011  -0.008 
Kenya 0.007  0.002  -0.005  0.004 
Madagascar  0.002 0.001  -0.004 -0.001 
Malawi  0.004 0.010  -0.002  0.012 
Mali  0.004 0.003  -0.001  0.006 
Mauritius 0.020  0.003  -0.010  0.014 
Mozambique  0.002 0.006  -0.005  0.003 
Niger  0.004 0.008  -0.004  0.007 
Nigeria 0.020  0.002  -0.019  0.003 
Papua New Guin  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
Senegal 0.017  0.001  -0.008  0.010 
Seychelles 0.081  0.012  -0.030  0.062 
South Africa  0.013  0.000  -0.006  0.006 
Sudan  0.003 0.000  -0.005 -0.002 
Tanzania  0.005 0.003  -0.009 -0.001 
Togo  0.006 0.007  -0.008  0.005 
Trinidad & Tobgo  0.001  0.000  -0.006  -0.005 
Uganda  0.001 0.002  -0.004 -0.001 
Zambia  0.001 0.006  -0.002  0.005 
Zimbabwe 0.004  0.013  -0.006  0.011 
Average 0.008  0.005  -0.008  0.010 
 
For the 13 least developed countries (LDCs) in 
the sample (highlighted in bold), only four (30%) 
experience an overall welfare loss (Madagascar,   10
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda), due to relatively high 
diversion from the ROW (relatively high TD&CE), 
although the figure is very small (typically 0.001% 
of GDP). Thus, 70% of LDCs experience a gain, 
ranging in magnitude from just over 0.01% of GDP 
(Malawi), to a rounded 0.01% (Benin, Mali, Niger, 
and at 0.005% Togo and Zambia), to only 0.001% in 
CAR. The majority of LDCs gain, and the gains 
tend to be greater than the net losses in absolute 
magnitude. 
Thirteen of the 21 non-LDC countries, almost 
two thirds, are estimated to experience a welfare 
improvement, ranging from 0.06% of GDP in the 
Seychelles, over 0.01% in six other countries, and 
just 0.001% in Ghana. Seven non-LDCs experience 
a welfare loss, the largest in absolute magnitude 
being the Bahamas at -0.02% of GDP, and the other 
losses are less than 0.01% of GDP.  As with LDCs, 
the majority of non-LDCs gain, and the gains tend to 
be greater than the net losses in absolute magnitude 
The overall welfare effect is negative for 12 
countries, 60% of which are non-LDCs; seven in the 
Caribbean, four in Africa (all LDCs) and PNG, the 
only Pacific country included.
6 In general, countries 
experiencing welfare losses sourced over 55% of  
 
imports from ROW (Appendix Table A3) and were 
the only countries with such high import shares from 
ROW. The implication is that the EU has a 
relatively strong capacity to displace some of these 
ROW imports and the import responsiveness 
(elasticities) are relatively low in those products 
where the EU is dominant. In sum, the losers are 
more likely to be non-LDCs that initially have a 
relatively high share of imports from the ROW (note 
that we consider welfare impacts excluding revenue 
effects). Nevertheless, a positive effect on welfare 
prevails. 
For the ACP sample overall and on average, 
imports from the EU increase by 8% of their pre-
EPA level, equivalent to 3% of total imports (Table 
3 below). Countries with an estimated welfare loss 
experience relatively low percentage increases in 
EU imports compared to the ACP average (Table 3). 
The implication is that these increases in imports are 
displacing imports from the ROW (to the extent that 
                                                           
6  Unfortunately, data availability for the small Pacific islands 
was very limited. South Africa is included although it only has 
observer status in the ACP. 
this does not occur in practice, we overestimate the 
adverse welfare impact). Although the increase in 
imports from the EU as a percentage of total imports 
shows no clear pattern comparing welfare gainers 
and losers, the gainers are more likely to experience 
an above average increase in imports from the EU 
(typically of products they were already importing 
from the EU).  This highlights the fact that it is not 
the change in total imports that matters, but structure 
of trade within the products affected (specifically, 
the balance between CE and TD). 
While the welfare effects are most likely to be 
positive, the revenue impacts are always negative; 
overall and on average the revenue loss is equivalent 
to 31% of tariff revenue from imports, just below 
one per cent of GDP (Table 4 below). Eight 
countries (22% of the sample of 36) could lose at 
least 30% of revenue on imports, typically 
equivalent to over 1% of GDP (but tariff structures 
and revenue totals vary considerably). Three of 
these are LDCs, although two (Burkina Faso at -
29% and Mali at -34%) are at the lower end of 
losses. At the higher extreme are CAR, Dominican 
Republic and Senegal where losses could exceed 
50% of tariff revenue, equivalent to 1.3%, 1.6% and 
14.6% of GDP respectively (Table 4). However, for 
11 countries the potential loss of tariff revenue is 
less than ten per cent of the pre-EPA level. 
 
B.  Treatment of Sensitive Products 
 
As the requirement is to liberalise ‘substantially all 
trade’ this allows ACP countries to exempt sensitive 
products (SPs) from liberalisation. As discussed 
above, tariffs can be maintained on 20-30% of 
products. For convenience, in the analysis of 
excluding SPs here we assume that 20% of imports 
can be excluded. There are no clear criteria for 
which products will be classed as SPs, and indeed 
this an issue on which negotiations have made very 
little progress. The ACP countries are negotiating as 
regional groups so they will have to agree a 
common list of SPs; our criterion is to define as SPs 
any products imported from the EU where other 
ACP countries account for at least five per cent of 
imports.
7 As long as the EU is already a competitor 
                                                           
7  We also applied a ‘revenue protection’ criterion of defining as 
SPs products on which tariffs were initially high. However, as it 
is usually the case that either tax substitution is possible (such as   11
in these markets the effect of exclusion will be to 
reduce CE gains, eliminate TC gains but possibly 
reduce TD losses. The net impact will depend on the 
combination of trade effects. For many ACP 
countries regional imports are a large share of the 
total (Table A1), typically the EU is not a 
competitor for these products so there is no need to 
exclude them as SPs. Although the possibility of the 
EU becoming a potential competitor under zero 
tariffs must be considered, the total imports 
excluded as SPs cannot exceed 20% of total imports 
from the EU (for the purposes of our estimates). 
The estimates of the composition of welfare 
effects when the criterion is applied to exclude SPs 
are shown in Table 2. It remains true that the ACP 
overall gains; although the ‘all countries’ ACP gain 
falls to a negligible 0.002% of GDP, the average 
gain falls only slightly to 0.008% of GDP. As 
expected, the TC gain is eliminated and the TD&CE 
loss falls, although the CE gain declines only 
marginally. This clearly reflects our (plausible) 
choice of SP criterion in excluding products 
imported from the ACP. It also follows from this 
choice that the estimated gain for most countries 
declines, while the estimated welfare loss tends to 
increase. Nevertheless, the welfare effects in most 
cases are quite small (and there are welfare gains for 
the ACP exporters that are not included). 
Table 3 shows the trade effects of excluding SPs. 
Unsurprisingly, the percentage increase in imports 
from the EU is reduced, but only slightly: for all 
countries, from 8% (equivalent to a 3.1% increase in 
total imports) to 7% (2.7%); on average, from 8% 
(2.2% on total) to 6% (1.7%). There is no evident 
pattern relating the net welfare impact, how this 
changes when SPs are excluded, and the 
proportional trade effects. Although the change in 
trade effects comparing inclusion to exclusion of 
SPs tend to be large for the countries experiencing a 
welfare reversal, this is not always the case. For 
example, excluding SPs the trade effects are much 
smaller for CAR and Mozambique, and roughly 





                                                                                              
Excises) or tariffs are unambiguously welfare reducing (such as 
food imports), this would not be the optimal criterion in welfare 
Table 2: Welfare Effects excluding SPs (as % GDP) 
Notes: As for Table 1, except here Sensitive 
Products (SPs), classified as products that 
are impor5ed from other ACP countries, 
have been excluded, i.e. tariffs on imports 
from EU are not eliminated for these 
products. 
 
Country  CE  TC&CE TD&CE Welfare 
        
All Countries (34)  0.009  0.000  -0.007  0.002 
        
Antigua & Barbuda  0.004  0.000  -0.009  -0.005 
Bahamas 0.000  0.000  -0.023  -0.023 
Belize 0.003  0.000  -0.007  -0.003 
Benin  0.005 0.000  -0.004  0.002 
Burkina Faso  0.003 0.000  0.000  0.002 
Cameroon 0.006  0.000  -0.004  0.003 
Central Africa Rep  0.000 0.000  -0.003 -0.003 
Cote D'ivoire  0.012  0.000  -0.003  0.009 
Dominica 0.002  0.000  -0.008  -0.006 
Dominican Rep  0.001  0.000  -0.007  -0.005 
Gabon 0.015  0.000  -0.003  0.012 
Ghana 0.007  0.000  -0.006  0.001 
Grenada 0.003  0.000  -0.010  -0.007 
Guyana 0.004  0.000  -0.011  -0.007 
Jamaica 0.000  0.000  -0.008  -0.008 
Kenya 0.006  0.000  -0.003  0.002 
Madagascar  0.002 0.000  -0.003 -0.001 
Malawi  0.002 0.000  0.000  0.001 
Mali  0.002 0.000  -0.001  0.001 
Mauritius 0.017  0.000  -0.006  0.010 
Mozambique  0.000 0.000  -0.001 -0.001 
Niger  0.002 0.000  -0.003  0.000 
Nigeria 0.011  0.000  -0.017  -0.007 
Papua New Guinea  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
Senegal 0.014  0.000  -0.006  0.008 
Seychelles 0.075  0.000  -0.010  0.065 
South Africa  0.013  0.000  -0.006  0.006 
Sudan  0.003 0.000  -0.005 -0.002 
Tanzania  0.002 0.000  -0.006 -0.004 
Togo  0.004 0.000  -0.007 -0.002 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.001  0.000  -0.006  -0.005 
Uganda  0.000 0.000  -0.002 -0.002 
Zambia  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Zimbabwe 0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
Average 0.007  0.000  -0.006  0.008 
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Table 3: Trade Effects of EPA on Imports from EU (%) 
 
Notes: Figures in % give change in imports from the 
EU (dMeu) relative to initial level of imports 
from the EU (Meu) and initial total imports (M). 
 
 Country  Including SPs  Excluding SPs 
  dMeu/Meu dMeu/M dMeu/Meu dMeu/M 
      
All  Countries  0.080 0.031 0.069 0.027 
      
Antigua  &  Ba  0.084 0.010 0.076 0.009 
Bahamas, The  0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 
Belize  0.162 0.009 0.160 0.008 
Benin  0.114 0.044 0.068 0.026 
Burkina  Faso 0.044 0.013 0.037 0.011 
Cameroon  0.120 0.040 0.106 0.036 
Central  Africa  0.056 0.012 0.009 0.002 
Cote  d'Ivoire 0.103 0.040 0.095 0.037 
Cuba  0.081 0.020 0.078 0.020 
Dominica  0.041 0.005 0.029 0.004 
Dominican  Re  0.050 0.006 0.050 0.006 
Gabon  0.157 0.105 0.124 0.083 
Ghana  0.063 0.023 0.050 0.018 
Grenada  0.041 0.006 0.030 0.004 
Guyana  0.044 0.004 0.040 0.004 
Jamaica  0.010 0.001 0.008 0.001 
Kenya  0.104 0.026 0.081 0.020 
Madagascar  0.031 0.007 0.026 0.006 
Malawi  0.048 0.007 0.021 0.003 
Mali  0.046 0.014 0.018 0.006 
Mauritius  0.105 0.036 0.085 0.029 
Mozambique 0.036 0.005 0.009 0.001 
Niger  0.074 0.018 0.047 0.011 
Nigeria  0.232 0.077 0.126 0.042 
Papua New G.  0.064 0.001 0.064 0.001 
Senegal  0.079 0.041 0.068 0.035 
Seychelles  0.270 0.090 0.249 0.083 
South  Africa 0.065 0.035 0.065 0.035 
Sudan  0.045 0.010 0.045 0.010 
Tanzania  0.087 0.015 0.032 0.006 
Togo  0.047 0.020 0.036 0.015 
Trinidad & To  0.026  0.003  0.020  0.002 
Uganda  0.013 0.002 0.004 0.001 
Zambia  0.032 0.004 0.006 0.001 
Zimbabwe  0.094 0.007 0.031 0.002 
Average  0.077 0.022 0.057 0.017 
 
Table 4 confirms that the revenue impact is 
reduced by excluding SPs, but agin the overall effect 
is small; from an average/overall of 31% of tariff 
revenue to 28%, or from 0.9% of GDP to 0.8%. 
Nevertheless, even with SPs excluded some 
countries can anticipate large revenue losses: four 
countries lose over 40% of revenue, 14 countries 
lose 10-30%, but 12 lose 5% or less. For those 
countries that are likely to experience large losses, it 
is important to begin planning how to recoup the 
losses. 
 
Table 4: Revenue Effects of EPA (Imports) 
 
Notes: Figures give change in tariff revenue (dTR) as a 
percentage of initial tariff revenue on imports 
(TR) and GDP. 
 










       
All  Countries  -31% -0.90%  -28% -0.81% 
       
Antigua  &  Barb -12% -0.63% -9% -0.49% 
Bahamas,  The   -0.02%   -0.01% 
Barbados  -11% -0.44%  -11% -0.42% 
Belize  -37% -0.87%  -25% -0.58% 
Benin  -19% -0.23%  -13% -0.16% 
Burkina  Faso  -29% -0.69%  -25% -0.60% 
Cameroon  -13% -0.26% -1% -0.03% 
Central Africa R  -53%  -1.25%  -48%  -1.15% 
Cote  d'Ivoire  -24%   -23%  
Cuba  -6% -0.42% -3% -0.19% 
Dominica  -8% -0.14% -8% -0.14% 
Dominican  Rep -59% -1.64%  -50% -1.40% 
Gabon  -27% -0.98%  -21% -0.76% 
Ghana  -7% -0.46% -4% -0.28% 
Grenada  -8% -0.52% -6% -0.38% 
Guyana  -3% -0.09% -1% -0.04% 
Jamaica  -22% -0.62%  -16% -0.43% 
Kenya  -16% -0.19%  -12% -0.14% 
Madagascar  -7% -0.36% -3% -0.14% 
Malawi  -21% -0.17%  -13% -0.11% 
Mali  -34% -2.12%  -23% -1.46% 
Mauritius  -8% -0.21% -1% -0.04% 
Mozambique  -19% -0.44%  -10% -0.23% 
Niger  -24% -1.33%  -19% -1.06% 
Nigeria  -5% -0.05% -5% -0.05% 
Papua New Gui  -43%  -1.45%  -36%  -1.20% 
Senegal  -51% -14.55% -47% -13.43%   13
Seychelles  -43% -1.09%  -43% -1.09% 
South  Africa  -15% -0.15%  -15% -0.15% 
Sudan   -0.29%   -0.10% 
Suriname  -12% -0.41% -4% -0.15% 
Tanzania  -24% -0.55%  -19% -0.43% 
Togo  -5% -0.08% -4% -0.06% 
Trinidad & Tob  -5%  -0.07%  -2%  -0.02% 
Uganda  -4% -0.10% -1% -0.01% 
Zambia  -12% -0.77% -2% -0.12% 
Zimbabwe  -20% -0.96%  -15% -0.77% 
Average  -31% -0.90%  -28% -0.81% 
 
Table 5 summarizes the effect on welfare 
estimates of excluding SPs: 79% of countries are 
worse-off under our classification of SPs, either 
because the extent of welfare loss is increased (7 
countries), a gain becomes a welfare loss (6) or the 
welfare gain is lower (14). Only 20% of countries 
are better-off, because the welfare loss is reduced 
(5); in one case the welfare gain is greater 
(Seychelles) and PNG experiences no change. There 
is no obvious particular feature that distinguishes the 
countries gaining by excluding SPs from those 
losing, although the gainers tend to have relatively 
low initial shares of imports from the ACP and none 
is an LDC. The number of countries estimated to 
experience a welfare loss increases from 12 to 18 
(53% of sample), as for six countries the gain was 
reversed to a loss (listed in Table 5). It is important 
to emphasize that whilst excluding ACP products 
from tariff reductions reduces potential gains in 
importing countries, from the (regional) ACP 
perspective this may be more than offset by 
producer gains in exporting countries. 
 
Table 5: Gainers and Losers from Excluding SPs (% GDP) 
 
Country dW  dW(SP)  Outcome 
Seychelles 0.06250  0.06484  Gain  Increased 
Grenada 0.00331  -0.00718  Gain  Reversed 
Guyana 0.01052  -0.00724  Gain  Reversed 
Mozambique 0.00283  -0.00104  Gain  Reversed 
Niger 0.00735  -0.00032  Gain  Reversed 
Nigeria 0.00281  -0.00662  Gain  Reversed 
Togo 0.00529  -0.00248  Gain  Reversed 
Antigua & Barb  -0.00429  -0.00485  Increased Loss 
Central Africa R  -0.00008  -0.00292  Increased Loss 
Dominica -0.00425  -0.00628  Increased  Loss 
Madagascar -0.00059  -0.00087  Increased  Loss 
Sudan -0.00224  -0.00225  Increased  Loss 
Tanzania -0.00123  -0.00360  Increased  Loss 
Uganda -0.00135  -0.00156  Increased  Loss 
Bahamas -0.02299  -0.02280  Loss  Reduced 
Belize -0.00416  -0.00342  Loss  Reduced 
Dominican Rep  -0.00545  -0.00534  Loss Reduced 
Jamaica -0.00802  -0.00758  Loss  Reduced 
Trinidad and Tob  -0.00505  -0.00492  Loss Reduced 
Benin 0.00627  0.00189  Reduced  Gain 
Burkina Faso  0.00357  0.00231  Reduced Gain 
Cameroon 0.00800  0.00256  Reduced  Gain 
Cote D'ivoire  0.01071  0.00884  Reduced Gain 
Gabon 0.01633  0.01198  Reduced  Gain 
Ghana 0.00102  0.00097  Reduced  Gain 
Kenya 0.00423  0.00237  Reduced  Gain 
Malawi 0.01173  0.00120  Reduced  Gain 
Mali 0.00559  0.00100  Reduced  Gain 
Mauritius 0.01424  0.01043  Reduced  Gain 
Senegal 0.01021  0.00797  Reduced  Gain 
South Africa  0.00606  0.00604  Reduced Gain 
Zambia 0.00489  0.00015  Reduced  Gain 
Zimbabwe 0.01106  0.00025  Reduced  Gain 
Papua New Guin  -0.00034  -0.00034  No change 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED 
EXTENSIONS 
 
Our analysis suggests that ACP countries should not 
be excessively concerned about the impact of EPAs: 
even assuming ‘immediate’ complete elimination of 
all tariffs on agriculture imports from the EU, and 
when excluding up to 20% of imports as sensitive 
products, almost half of ACP countries are likely to 
experience welfare gains. When not excluding SPs, 
most LDCs (nine out of 13) and non-LDCs (14 out 
of 21) gain.
8 As is typical with estimates of welfare 
impacts, the overall effect relative to GDP tends to 
be very small, whether positive or negative. This is 
the most important conclusion: even excluding SPs, 
with the exception of the Bahamas (-0.02%) all 
estimated losses are less than 0.01% of GDP, as are 
                                                           
8  As our partial equilibrium method only considers the welfare 
effect on imports, and hence on countries as importers, we do 
not allow for the potential loss of ACP regional exporters 
displaced by competition from the EU in regional markets. As 
non-LDCs are more likely to be regional exporters, albeit in 
manufacturing (not considered here) rather than agriculture, our 
estimates may understate their losses. On the other hand, it is 
the non-LDCs who stand to gain most from increased trade 
preferences in access to the EU under an EPA.   14
all estimated gains (with the exception of the 
Seychelles at 0.07%). While potential tariff revenue 
losses are non-negligible, given that countries have 
at least ten years in which to implement the tariff 
reductions, there is scope for tax substitution. 
An important issue, as yet unresolved, in EPA 
negotiations is identifying the sensitive products 
(SPs) to be excluded from tariff reduction. We 
excluded products where ACP imports compete with 
the EU as this protects regional trade and SPs have 
to be agreed at the regional ACP level. In general, 
excluding SPs on these criteria reduced the welfare 
gain (or increased the welfare loss) compared to 
estimates where no products are excluded: most 
LDCs (seven out of 13) and non-LDCs (10 out of 
21) lose, although in both cases it is effectively an 
even split between winners and losers. This was to 
be expected as if ACP products are excluded as SPs 
the potential trade creation gains are reduced. We 
leave it to future further analysis to consider other 
SP criteria. In particular, as trade diversion is the 
major source of welfare losses for an individual 
country, in welfare terms it may be optimal to treat 
some products imported from the rest of the world 
as SPs, as the EU is unlikely to be the globally most 
efficient supplier. 
An inherent limitation of our partial equilibrium 
approach is that we cannot allow for effects on 
domestic producers. Nevertheless, the partial 
approach does help to identify products where the 
trade and welfare effects are likely to be large. We 
could extend the analysis to list specific products for 
which effects seem relatively large; country analysis 
could then relate this to production data (in some 
cases, we would be able to refer to other country-
specific CGE studies). Finally, the focus of our 
analysis did not permit including estimates of the 
potential benefits to ACP countries of enhanced 
preferential access for their exports to the EU under 
EPAs, or indeed of the gains to regional exporters of 
excluding regionally traded products as SPs. Even if 
these export gains are small in welfare, they could 
potentially offset the small welfare losses of losing 
countries (and increase the gains of others). 
According to our estimates, EPAs do not represent a 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1: ACP Countries who have signed EPAs 
 
 
Nature of EPA  Regional EPA (20)  Bilateral EPAs (15)  Not signed (40)
9 







Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Dominican Rep., Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts 
& Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent 
& Grenadines, Suriname, 


















East African Community: 










Remaining ESA countries 
















Central African Rep., 
DR Congo, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, 










Cook Is., Kiribati, 
Marshall Is., 
Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Samoa, 

































   
 
West Africa: 






Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo 
                                                           
9  Three more ACP countries, East Timor, Cuba and Somalia, were not negotiating EPAs.   17
APPENDIX TABLE A2: EPA Trade of Liberalization Commitments 
 
Source: “EU-ACP EPAs: State of Play and Key Issues for 2008,” EC Staff Working Paper (2008). 
 
Country 
Proportion (%) of imports from 
EU committed to liberalization 
Period (Years) for 
Tariff Elimination 
    
CARIFORUM 87  25 
East African Community  82  25 
Cameroon 80  15 
Comoros 80  15 
Madagascar 80  15 
Mauritius 96  15 
Seychelles 98  15 
Zimbabwe 80  15 
Fiji 81  15 
Papua New Guinea  88  First date of implementation 
SACU 86  15 
Mozambique 81 15 
Ghana 81  15 
Ivory Coast  81  15   18
APPENDIX TABLE A3: Imports by Source 
 
Notes: The countries highlighted in bold are classified as LDCs; Year refers to the year for which data were used. 
 
Country Year  ACP  EU  ROW 
        
Antigua and Barbuda  2005  16%  11%  72% 
Bahamas, The  2001  1%  2%  96% 
Belize 2006  3%  5%  92% 
Benin  2005 27%  38%  34% 
Burkina Faso  2004 35%  30%  35% 
Cameroon 2006  36%  34%  30% 
Central African Republic  2005 29%  21%  50% 
Cote d'Ivoire  2006  32%  39%  28% 
Cuba 2004  1%  25%  74% 
Dominica 2006  33%  13%  55% 
Dominican Republic  2001  1%  13%  86% 
Gabon 2006  8%  67%  25% 
Ghana 2006  20%  36%  44% 
Grenada 2005  24%  15%  62% 
Guyana 2006  36%  10%  54% 
Jamaica 2006  15%  10%  76% 
Kenya 2004  13%  25%  62% 
Madagascar  2006 11%  23%  65% 
Malawi  2006 62%  15%  23% 
Mali  2004 45%  31%  24% 
Mauritius 2006  10%  35%  55% 
Mozambique  2006 47%  14%  39% 
Niger  2005 33%  24%  43% 
Nigeria 2003  5%  33%  62% 
Papua New Guinea  2003  1%  2%  97% 
Senegal 2006  13%  52%  36% 
Seychelles 2006  11%  33%  56% 
South Africa  2006  3%  53%  44% 
Sudan  2005 2%  23%  75% 
Suriname 2000  0%  0%  0% 
Tanzania  2006 18%  17%  65% 
Togo  2005 17%  42%  41% 
Trinidad and Tobago  2006  18%  11%  72% 
Uganda  2006 24%  19%  57% 
Zambia  2006 61%  12%  28% 
Zimbabwe 2005  76%  7%  17% 
 
 
 